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Despite the judge's charge to the jury that the jury should not
make any negative inferences when a witness asserts his Fifth
Amendment privilege, the prosecution's conduct led to an unfair
trial for the defendant. 43 Thus, the New York Court of Appeals
44
reversed and ordered a new trial.
In sum, under both the Federal and New York Constitution,
reversible error may be committed when the prosecution calls a
witness for the sole purpose of using his or her assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination against the defendant.
Respectfully enforcing the United State Supreme Court's decision
in Namet, the New York Court of Appeals held that reversible
error may be committed where the prosecution makes a
"conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences
arising from use of the testimonial privilege" 45 or where a
witness's invocation of the privilege unduly prejudices the
defendant. 46

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
47
People v. Spinelli

(decided September 15, 1995)

The defendant, Thomas Spinelli, was convicted in the Supreme
Court, Queens County of second-degree manslaughter and moved
to have this verdict reversed on the ground that his right against
self-incrimination was violated. 4 8 The Appellate Division,

43. Id.

44. Id. at 224, 654 N.E.2d at 1226, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
45. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186 (1963).
46. Id. at 187.
47. 214 A.D.2d 135, 631 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2d Dep't 1995).
48. Id. at 138, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 864. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall [any person] be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.; N.Y. CONST.
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Second Department held that the use of the defendant's silence in
summation deprived the defendant of a fair trial because the
defendant was not confronted with his omissions nor was he
given an opportunity to explain his omissions. 49
The defendant and the victim, Jerry Liebowitz, were involved
in an altercation which took place on the street near the parties'
residences. 50 When the police arrived, Liebowitz was lying
halfway inside his car with a gunshot wound in his chest. 5 1 The
defendant stated "I shot him. I shot him." 5 2 After the gun was
recovered in the defendant's house, the defendant was read his
rights and was placed under arrest. 53 The defendant then said,
without any police questioning, "another man Eddie was
involved. He had a gun and he ran and put it in the house. " 54
The defendant was referring to Eddie Cintron, who was
employed by Liebowitz, and was present at the scene of the
crime. 55 Cintron testified at trial for the prosecution. He stated
that as Liebowitz pulled his car out of its parking spot, the
defendant threw a bag of trash at the car, and tried to pull
Liebowitz out of the car. 56 When Cintron saw the defendant
shoot Liebowitz, he ran into Liebowitz' apartment and got a gun
which Cintron pointed at the defendant. 57 When the defendant
went back into his house, Cintron became worried that he would
be blamed for the murder, so he replaced the gun in Liebowitz'
house prior to the arrival of the police. 58
The defendant testified at trial that, after he threw the bag of
garbage at Liebowitz' car, he tried to walk away, but Liebowitz
art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall [any person] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
49. Spinelli, 214 A.D.2d at 139, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
50. Id. at 137, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 137, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65.
53. Id. at 137, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 865.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

58. Id.
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"lunged" his car at him and he was hit twice. 59 The defendant
further testified that Liebowitz got out of the car with a gun in
his hand and started to hit him with the gun. 60 The defendant
stated that, in his attempt to pull the gun out of Liebowitz' hand,
the gun accidentally fired. 61 When Liebowitz noticed the blood
on himself, he sat down in his car and the defendant picked up
the gun and put it in his house, out of the reach of his children. 62
At trial, the prosecutor neglected to cross-examine the
defendant regarding his failure to tell the police that the shooting
was accidental or was for the purpose of self-defense. 63 Instead,
on redirect examination of the investigating officer, the
prosecutor asked, "[s]o he [the defendant] never said to you
anything about an accident or self-defense, did he?" 64
Furthermore, during his closing argument, the prosecutor
repeatedly stated that the defendant's account of the events was
unworthy of belief because the defendant failed to tell police at
the scene of the crime that the shooting was an accident or was
done in self-defense. 65 The prosecutor stated that the only
explanation for why the defendant did not tell the police the
version of the story which the defendant told on the stand, was
"because it never happened that way." 66
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial
due to the prosecutor's use of the defendant's pretrial silence
during redirect examination of the investigating officer and
during closing arguments. 67 The appellate division held that the
prosecution's closing statements deprived the defendant of a fair
trial because the "defendant was not confronted with his
omissions and given an opportunity to explain them."' 68 In
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 137-38, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
62. Id.at 138, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 139, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 866. The Spinelli court rejected the claim
that the prosecutor's question to the investigating officer on redirect
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reaching its holding, the court cited People v. Basora,69 which
stated the New York rule that the exercise of a defendant's
constitutional right to remain silent may not be used by the State
as part of their direct case. 70 The Basora case also held that,
pursuant to New York State's rules of evidence, "silence in the
face of police interrogation shortly after evidence of a crime is
uncovered is usually ambiguous and its probative value
minimal." 7 1 The Spinelli court continued its analysis by stating
that "[riegardless of whether the defendant's omission of
exculpatory facts from his statements to the police could be used

to impeach his credibility once he testified, the People could not
72
attempt to use those omissions as direct proof of his guilt."

examination constituted reversible error because "It]he court sustained the
defendant's objection, [the officer] did not answer the question, and the jury
was instructed that the question was 'completely inappropriate' and that they
were to disregard it." Id.
69. 75 N.Y.2d 992, 556 N.E.2d 1070, 557 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1990). In
Basora, the defendant's agent sold drugs to an undercover police officer while
the defendant watched from a distance. Id. at 993, 556 N.E.2d at 1070, 557
N.Y.S.2d at 263. At trial, it was the state's theory that the defendant, who was
a major drug dealer, had planned the sale but had carefully taken precautions
so as to protect himself from liability. Id. at 993, 556 N.E.2d at 1071, 557
N.Y.S.2d at 264. In order to support the state's theory, the state called an
arresting officer as a witness who testified that after the defendant was
informed of the arrest, the defendant "kind of smiled." Id. During the
prosecution's closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on the fact that the
defendant smiled in order to show that the defendant believed that he
adequately protected himself so as to avoid a finding of guilt. Id. Though the
Basora court found that the defendant's Fifth Amendment right had been
violated "by attributing communicative value to his act of smiling," the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the abundance of proof
indicating the defendant's guilt. Id. at 993-94, 556 N.E.2d at 1071-72, 557
N.Y.S.2d at 264-65.
70. Id. at 993, 556 N.E.2d at 1071, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 264. See also People
v. DeGeorge, 73 N.Y.2d 614, 620, 541 N.E.2d 11, 14, 543 N.Y.S.2d 11, 14
(1989) (holding that defendant's pre-arrest silence, when investigating officer
inquired as to what took place, could not be used to impeach defendant's
testimony on cross-examination or as direct evidence of his "depraved
indifference to human life" in committing the assault).
71. Basora, 75 N.Y.2d at 993, 556 N.E.2d at 1071, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
72. Spinelli, 214 A.D.2d at 139, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
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The Spinelli court explained that when a defendant gives a
voluntary

statement to the police which fails to include

"exculpatory circumstances" which the defendant testifies to at
trial, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does
not prohibit cross-examination of the defendant regarding the

reason why the defendant failed to mention the exculpatory
circumstances to the police. 73 The court added that it is not
necessary that the defendant give a "complete narrative" of

circumstances surrounding the crime before the defendant may be
questioned on cross-examination regarding his omissions.74 It is

merely necessary that the defendant's communication to the
police was voluntary and the omitted circumstances which are
testified to are significant. 75 The omissions which were made by
the defendant in the case at bar were deemed by the court to be
73. Id. at 140, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 866. See People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d
673, 409 N.E.2d 858, 431 N.Y.S.2d 382, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
In Savage, the defendant was arrested for shooting the victim outside of a bar
during an argument. Id.at 676, 409 N.E.2d at 859, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
Immediately following the arresting officer's recitation of the defendant's
Miranda warnings, the defendant stated "I'm glad I'm caught-I'm tired," and
then described his role in the crime and confessed that he shot the victim. Id.
at 677, 409 N.E.2d at 859, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 383. When the defendant took the
stand in his own defense, he stated that he shot the victim when an altercation
ensued because the victim had tried to rob him, and that the firing of the gun
was accidental. Id. at 677, 409 N.E.2d at 859-60, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the defendant so as to
insinuate recent fabrication regarding the exculpatory circumstances to which
the defendant testified to on the stand. Id.at 677, 409 N.E.2d at 860, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 383. The court held that such prosecutorial questioning was
permissible because the defendant had voluntarily responded to the police
officer's questions, and the defendant's statements "expressly incorporated
essential elements of the crime with which he was to be charged ... [b]ut
excluded from all this was the crucial exculpatory circumstance to which the
defendant later was to testify . . ." Id. at 678, 409 N.E.2d at 860-61, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 384. The Savage court focused on the importance of the omission,
stating that "what was omitted is far from an inconsequential detail or a
collateral matter, but a fact of such overwhelming significance that its absence
from the narrative was at least as calculated to distort his recitation as a most
affirmative falsehood." Id. at 679, 409 N.E.2d at 861, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
74. Spinelli, 214 A.D.2d at 141, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
75. Id.
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"extraordinarily probative" regarding the jury's evaluation of the
defendant's testimony on the stand. 76 This was because the
77
omissions directly concerned the circumstances of the shooting.
Theoretically, the prosecutor's closing statements regarding

Spinelli's omissions would have been permissible had the
prosecutor laid the proper foundation by cross-examining the
defendant regarding the omissions when the defendant was on the
stand. 78 However, the prosecutor failed to address the omissions
during cross-examination of the defendant and his comments
during summation were "fundamentally unfair."79 The Spinelli

court stated that when omissions of exculpatory circumstances are
used for purposes of impeachment on cross-examination, there
are certain protections which must be afforded to the defendant: 80
The court is required, upon the defendant's request, to advise the
jury that he was under no obligation to speak, and the defendant
must be provided an opportunity to explain the omissions, either
through his answers to the prosecutor's questions or through
81
questioning by defense counsel on redirect examination.

By waiting until the closing arguments of the case, the State took
away the defendant's opportunity to explain why he did not recite
the exculpatory circumstances to the police. 82 The defendant's
silence in such a situation could be for a number of different
83
reasons which the jury was never given a chance to hear.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 142, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. See People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 420 N.E.2d 933,
935, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1981). The Conyers court stated that:
[The individual's silence in such circumstances may simply be
attributable to his awareness that he is under no obligation to speak or to
the natural caution that arises from his knowledge that anything he says
might later be used against him at trial... [or to the fact] that some of
our citizens harbor a mistrust for law enforcement authority which leads
them to shun contact with the police even when the avoidance of contact
is not in their own best interest.
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The federal system treats the use of pre-arrest silence
differently than New York State. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 84 the
defendant fatally stabbed the victim, but did not explain the
circumstances surrounding the stabbing to the police. 85 The
defendant took the stand and testified that the stabbing was an act
of self-defense, in response to an attack by the victim who had
allegedly robbed the defendant the night before. 86 On crossexamination and in closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to
the defendant's pre-arrest silence in order to attack his credibility
as a witness. 87 The defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
was violated. 88 The Supreme Court of the United States held that
such cross-examination is not a violation of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment right because this right is waived once the defendant
takes the stand as a witness. 89 The Jenkins Court interpreted the
Fifth Amendment as guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right
to remain silent during the course of his trial and prohibiting the
prosecution from using such silence as a means of attack. 90 Once
a defendant takes the stand, however, he is subject to the same
cross-examination rules as any witness.91
Furthermore, the Court elaborated on the policy justifications
for such an interpretation of a defendant's pre-arrest silence. The
prosecution's attempted impeachment of a criminal defendant on
cross-examination allows the credibility of a defendant to be
tested by forcing them to justify their inconsistent statements.92
The Court noted that the defendant need not take the stand, and
such a decision is a choice of "litigation tactics" which are left to

Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Id. at 232-33.
Id.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 235.

90. Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
91. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
92. Id. at 238.
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the defendant. 93 The Court concluded by stating that
"impeachment follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside
his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the
94
criminal trial."

The Jenkins case was decided in a dramatically different way
than a New York State court would have decided the same issue.
In People v. Conyers,95 the defendant's conviction of several
crimes, including robbery, was reconsidered based on his
argument that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated. 96 The
defendant remained silent to the investigating police officers, but
offered testimony on the stand which stated that there had been
no robbery. 97 The prosecutor cross-examined the defendant
regarding his pretrial silence and commented on this silence
during closing arguments. 98 The court of appeals held that a
defendant's silence during arrest may not be used to impeach his
credibility because such a use would violate a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights. 99 The State petitioned the Supreme Court of
the United States to review the decision, and while such appeal
was pending, the case of Jenkins v. Anderson was decided. After
the Jenkins decision, the Supreme Court granted the State's
petition for certiorari and vacated the decision in Conyers L100
The Supreme Court instructed the Court of Appeals of New York
to reconsider Conyers in light of the Jenkins decision. 10 1
In Conyers II, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed their earlier
holding that, even in light of the Jenkins decision, "[New York]
State rules of evidence preclude the use of a defendant's pretrial
93. Id.

94. Id.
95. 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 402, vacated, New
York v. Conyers, 449 U.S. 809 (1980), on remand sub nom. People v.
Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 420 N.E.2d 933, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1981).
96. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d at 176-77, 400 N.E.2d at 344, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
404.
97. Id. at 176, 400 N.E.2d at 344, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 177, 400 N.E.2d at 345, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
100. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d at 456, 420 N.E.2d at 934, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
101. Id.
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silence to impeach his trial testimony." 102 The Conyers II court
added that "the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes
10 3
cannot be justified in the absence of unusual circumstances."
Whereas the federal view regards a defendant's Fifth
Amendment right as waived once he takes the stand, New York
believes that even if a defendant takes the stand, his pretrial
silence may not automatically be used to impeach his credibility.
According to federal interpretation, the Fifth Amendment gives
the defendant the right to remain silent and not take the stand
during his trial. New York's interpretation provides more
extensive protection to a defendant who is silent at the time of
arrest. This is achieved by making him immune, absent unusual
circumstances, to cross-examination which tries to impeach his
credibility by attacking his silence as conflicting with his trial
testimony. It is imperative to note, however, that, in New York,
when a defendant voluntarily offers information to police officers
at the time of arrest, but is silent as to very significant details, the
prosecutor may question a defendant who takes the stand in
regard to such omissions for purposes of impeachment. 104

102. Id. at 457, 420 N.E.2d at 934, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 742. The New York

Court of Appeals based its holding on the premise that the probative value of
evidence of silence at the time of arrest which is later used for impeachment
purposes is often outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant. Id. at
459, 420 N.E.2d at 936, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
103. Id. at 459, 420 N.E.2d at 935-36, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
104. Spinelli, 214 A.D.2d at 140, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 867 (2d Dep't 1995).
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